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ABSTRACT
We investigate the ability of an attacker to passively use an
otherwise secure wireless network to detect moving people
through walls. We call this attack on privacy of people a
“monitoring radio windows” (MRW) attack. We design and
implement the MRW attack methodology to reliably detect
when a person crosses the link lines between the legitimate
transmitters and the attack receivers, by using physical layer
measurements. We also develop a method to estimate the
direction of movement of a person from the sequence of link
lines crossed during a short time interval. Additionally, we
describe how an attacker may estimate any artificial changes
in transmit power (used as a countermeasure), compensate
for these power changes using measurements from sufficient
number of links, and still detect line crossings. We imple-
ment our methodology onWiFi and ZigBee nodes and exper-
imentally evaluate the MRW attack by passively monitoring
human movements through external walls in two real-world
settings. We find that achieve close to 100% accuracy in de-
tecting line crossings and determining direction of motion,
even through reinforced concrete walls.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Miscella-
neous
Keywords
Radio Window; WiFi; Signal strength; Line Crossing
1. INTRODUCTION
We investigate an attack to the privacy of the people mov-
ing in an area covered by a wireless network. People moving
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Figure 1: Monitoring Radio Windows (MRW) attack exam-
ple.
in an area covered by one or more wireless networks affect
the way radio signals propagate. We demonstrate that the
presence, location and direction of movement of people not
carrying any wireless device can be “eavesdropped”by using
the channel information of wireless links artificially created
by an attacker by deploying sensing devices or receivers that
can passively “hear” transmitters such as WiFi access points
(APs), composing the legitimate wireless network. Radio
signals from transmitters passing through non-metal exter-
nal walls are analogous to light from light bulbs passing
through glass windows in that either can be used to “see”
where building occupants are moving from outside of the
building. Hence, we call this attack on privacy of people an
“monitoring radio windows” (MRW) attack.
Consider a building where security is important (e.g., an
embassy) with a concrete exterior wall. One or more wireless
networks may have been set up in this building to transfer
different types of data, including voice and video. We can
expect these networks to implement advanced data security
protocols to prevent eavesdropping of data. However, an at-
tacker can still deploy receivers outside the wall of the build-
ing to passively measure different parameters of the received
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radio signals. By measuring the channel state information
(CSI) or received signal strength (RSS), for example, of the
links from the transmitters inside the building to the re-
ceivers deployed, the attacker can monitor the movements
of people and objects inside the building in the area be-
hind the wall in Figure 1. The information about people’s
movements can be put to malicious use including planning
a physical attack on the personnel inside the building.
In this paper, we design and implement the MRW at-
tack methodology for through wall people localization. Our
methodology relies on reliably detecting when people cross
the link lines between the legitimate transmitters and the
attack receivers. We first develop a majority-vote based de-
tection algorithm that reliably detects line of sight (LOS)
crossing between the legitimate transmitter and the attack
receivers by comparing short-term variances in link channel
information with their long-term counterparts. We also de-
velop a method to estimate the direction of movement of a
person from the sequence of link lines crossed during a short
time interval. Next, we implement our methodology onWiFi
and ZigBee nodes and experimentally evaluate the MRW at-
tack by monitoring people’s movements through walls in two
real-world settings – a hallway of a university building sepa-
rated from the outside by a one-foot thick concrete wall, and
a residential house. When we use two WiFi 802.11n nodes
with normal antenna separation, or two groups of ZigBee
nodes as attack receivers, we find that our methods achieve
close to 100% accuracy in detecting line crossings and the di-
rection of movement. We also find that our methods achieve
90− 100% accuracy when we use a single 802.11n attack re-
ceiver. We note that our goal in this paper is not to precisely
estimate the location of a moving person but rather, only de-
tect line crossings and determine the direction of movement
through walls. This coarse-granular location information vi-
olates the person’s privacy and can be used by an attacker.
To protect the privacy of the location information from
the MRW attack, the owner of the legitimate network may
choose to implement a countermeasure in which the trans-
mitters vary their transmit power during successive trans-
missions. The artificial transmit power changes can be ei-
ther random or follow a pre-defined profile replicating the
typical channel variations introduced when a person crosses
a link line. This countermeasure is expected to introduce
additional variability in the received signal measured by the
attack receivers, which can be wrongly interpreted by the
attacker as caused by moving people or objects crossing the
link lines. In this paper, we demonstrate that an attacker
who can measure a sufficient number of links can accurately
estimate the artificial transmit power change, compensate
for it, and ultimately locate people and monitor their move-
ments. We base our compensation strategy on the following
intuition: an artificial transmit power change at a trans-
mitter will impact the measurements at all attack receivers
with approximately the same magnitude of change, whereas
genuine power changes due to human movement are likely
to impact receivers each with a different magnitude. This
intuition also suggests that protecting against radio window
attacks is a very hard problem because any change at the
source of transmission can be possibly compensated for by
correlating measurements across multiple attack receivers.
The idea of using radio signals through walls for obtaining
location information is not new and has been used in exist-
ing efforts including Radio Tomographic Imaging (RTI) [25],
WiVi [2], and WiTrack [1], among others. However, the ex-
isting literature does not demonstrate that an attacker can
obtain location information 1) without transmitting (and
thus not subject to jamming or source localization); and 2)
through thick external walls (such as reinforced concrete)
and in large buildings. Wilson et al. developed RTI [25] to
track human movement through walls by deploying dozens
of transceivers throughout or on many sides of a room in a
residential home. However, RTI requires active transmission
from all the deployed nodes, and, hence it can be detected
by source localization and/or countered by jamming. Note
that for solid external walls, penetration loss can be very
high, e.g., about 20 dB/ft through concrete at 2.4 GHz [21].
Since the signal must penetrate external walls twice, once
to enter and once to exit the building, transmit power must
be very high in order to achieve useful range.
Adib et al. [2] developed WiVi to track moving humans
through walls inside a closed room using WiFi signals. In
a follow up work, Adib et al. [1] developed a 3-D through-
wall motion tracking system, WiTrack, that can be used to
track the 3D location of a moving person inside a room,
and to detect falls and simple gestures. Though efficient,
these methods also depend on active probing requiring cus-
tom hardware to send WiFi signals through a barrier (e.g.,
a wall) and measure the way it reflects back from objects
on the other side. Like RTI, these methods are vulnera-
ble to detection and jamming, and must penetrate an ex-
ternal wall twice. Note that WiTrack was demonstrated
through drywall [1], which has a 0.5 dB penetration loss at
2.4 GHz [26]. Our work is stealthier in that purely passive
receivers are deployed by an attacker to measure signals from
the transmitters already deployed in existing infrastructure.
The attack receivers do not transmit any signal or interfere
with the existing transmissions in any way - hence they can
not be detected using source localization and are immune
to jamming. Furthermore, the active signal transmission
from outside the wall, forces WiVi and WiTrack to perform
a costly “nulling” procedure to counteract the flash effect
- the strong reflection from the wall that overshadows sig-
nals reflected back from inside the room. We rely only on
the transmitted signal from the existing infrastructure in-
side the facility to detect a person’s movement, hence the
flash effect does not apply. We can perform our location de-
tection with simpler algorithms and off the shelf hardware.
Unlike WiVi and WiTrack, our method enables the attacker
to see through dense wall material, including 12 inch thick
reinforced concrete walls. In a related work that is not di-
rectly concerned with location privacy [18], Pu et al. showed
that Doppler shifts resulting from multipath distortions, due
to reflections of wireless signals from a human body, can be
used to identify human gestures. However, their work re-
lies on classification of gestures based on extensive learning.
One must actively perform a startup sequence of gestures in
the direction of the wireless receiver(s) to get into the con-
trol system before sending the real gesture commands. Our
research does not consider human gestures and hence does
not require an extensive learning phase.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 describes the adversary model, while in Section 3
we introduce the methods developed. Experimental setup
and results are presented in Sections 4 and 5, respectively.
Additional existing research in the area of location privacy
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attacks is discussed in Section 6. Conclusions are given in
Section 7.
2. ADVERSARYMODEL
We make the following assumptions about the attacker
(In this paper, we use the term attacker for anyone, whether
malicious or genuine, who is trying to detect human move-
ment):
• The attacker is able to deploy multiple wireless sens-
ing devices within the transmission range of the legiti-
mate transmitter(s) outside the area being monitored.
The attacker is able to measure the physical layer in-
formation (RSS and/or CSI) of the links between the
transmitter(s) and the attack receivers.
• The attacker does not have access to the content of the
packets transmitted by the legitimate network nodes.
• The attacker does not deploy any transmitters, nor
does it have any control over the legitimate transmit-
ters. However, it requires the legitimate transmitters
to transmit packets frequently to allow it perform the
line crossing detections.
• The attacker does not make any assumption regarding
the transmit power profile of the transmitters.
• The attacker nodes do not associate or interfere in any
manner with the transmissions of the legitimate trans-
mitter(s).
• The attacker may not know the precise location of the
transmitters, however, we do assume that the trans-
mitter is located well inside the perimeters of buildings
for network coverage.
• The attacker may deploy the MRW attack when it is
dark to minimize the chance of getting detected.
3. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we first develop a methodology to detect
line crossings of a single person based on a majority vote
for WiFi 802.11n receivers. We also develop a method that
uses a sequence of line crossings to determine the direction
of the movement. Next, we present our approaches for esti-
mating transmit power change and its compensation, when
the transmit power is artificially changed by the owner of the
wireless transmitters, inside a secure building, with the hope
of preserving location privacy. Last, we show how we adapt
our methodology for IEEE 802.15.4 ZigBee attack receivers.
3.1 Line Crossing Detection
Many modern WiFi networks use the 802.11n standard, in
which transceivers are equipped with multiple antennas in
order to leverage the spatial diversity of the wireless chan-
nel. While these multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
systems provide high data rates, they also provide a rich
source of channel information to an adversary interested in
localizing people inside a building.
The 802.11n wireless standard uses the well-known or-
thogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) modula-
tion scheme, which encodes and transmits data across mul-
tiple subcarriers for each transmitter-receiver antenna pair.
When an 802.11n receiver receives a packet, it estimates the
effect of the wireless channel on each MIMO OFDM sub-
carrier for the purpose of channel equalization. Since this
channel state information (CSI), represented as a complex
gain for each subcarrier, is measured during the unencrypted
preamble of each WiFi packet, an adversary without legit-
imate access to data on the network can still measure the
CSI for every packet.
We apply a windowed variance method for detecting abrupt
changes in the CSI for a WiFi link. Let Hj,k(n) be the
magnitude of the signal strength for the jth transmitter-
receiver antenna pair and the kth OFDM subcarrier for the
nth packet. We define the windowed variance measurement













where, w is the number of previous CSI samples in the win-
dow and H¯wj,k(n) is the average signal strength for the jth
transmitter-receiver antenna pair computed over w.
We define the subcarrier-average variance and standard



















where N is the number of subcarriers. We track both V wj (n)
and Swj (n) over a short-term time window ws, and a long-





j (n) − V
wl
j (n) > γ(n), (3)
where D is the most recent contiguous set of packets for
which V wsj (n)−V
wl
j (n) > 0 and the threshold γ(n) is defined
as
γ(n) = V wlj (n) + CS
wl
j (n). (4)
γ(n) determines the sensitivity of the detection system, smaller
values of γ(n) will ensure low missed detection rate but will
increase the probability of false alarms. On the other hand,
larger values of γ(n) will lower false alarm rates at the ex-
pense of higher missed detection rates. The constant C is
included to allow the user to adjust the trade-off between
false alarms and missed detections.
To improve robustness, in the case where there are more
than two antenna pairs, we take the majority vote between
antenna pairs over the short-term window to decide if a line
crossing has occurred. More specifically, when a receiver
antenna detects a line crossing, we count the line crossing
detections for all the receiver antennas over the short-term
window, ws. For a 3×3 MIMO transmitter and receiver, this
would mean computing a majority vote over nine measure-
ments. When the majority of the receiver antennas detect a
line crossing within ws, we infer that a person has crossed the
link line between the transmitter and the receiver. We will
show that this majority vote method improves the perfor-
mance of our detector by decreasing false alarms and missed
detections.
We note that our window-based variance method differs
from the method presented in [19,28]. In [19,28], Youssef et
al. compare recent window-based variance measurements of
RSSI at multiple WiFi links to measurements made during a
static calibration period when nobody is moving in the area
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of interest. If a certain number of WiFi links within the
area of interest detect motion within a certain time inter-
val, a motion event is detected in the area of interest. Our
attacker does not know if and/or when people are moving in-
side of the building, and therefore cannot create calibration
measurements based on a static environment. Instead, we
compare a short-term window variance to a long-term win-
dowed variance. The long-term window allows us to capture
the behavior of the wireless links when the majority of mea-
surements are likely made while there is nobody crossing the
link line. Additionally, in the case of 802.11n, we exploit the
effect that line crossings have on each OFDM subcarrier and
MIMO antenna pair.
3.2 Determining Direction of Motion
If the adversary measures the CSI at multiple receivers,
or if a single receiver includes multiple antennas as is the
case with 802.11n, it is also possible to infer the direction
that a person is walking when line crossings are detected.
The direction of motion is inferred from the time differences
between the line crossing detections at each receiver, in the
case of multiple receivers, or at each transmitter-receiver
antenna pair, when the receivers include multiple antennas.
Consider the scenario where the attacker arranges the
MIMO antenna array of an 802.11n receiver such that the
antennas are roughly parallel to a hallway as shown in Fig-
ure 2(a). The spatial order of the antennas with reference
to the hallway is known, and each transmitter-receiver an-
tenna is given an index according to its spatial order. Based
on the adversary model assumption that a transmitter is
located well inside the perimeter, the attacker, even with-
out knowing the precise location of the transmitter or the
arrangement of its antennas, may treat the antennas of the
wireless transmitter as if they are co-located and still achieve
reliable results.
In the single WiFi receiver case, if a link crossing is de-
tected by majority vote for a given short-term window, we
find the line that best fits the set of points {(dj , nj) : j ∈ P},
where dj is the spatial index of antenna pair j representing
it’s location relative to the other links, nj is the packet in-
dex indicating when a detection occurred at antenna pair j
according to (3), and P is the set of antenna pairs ending
at the WiFi receiver which detected a line crossing during
the short-term window. The sign of the slope of this line
indicates the direction of motion. Figure 2 shows an exam-
ple which uses CSI measurements from three antennas at
the WiFi transmitter and three antennas at WiFi RX1 (9
antenna pairs). In the case of two single-input single-output
(SISO) WiFi receivers, a similar method may be applied,
but the two spatial and packet indexes directly determine
the line and its slope.
3.3 Compensation of Transmit Power Change
In this subsection, we propose a methodology to detect
artificial transmit power changes (if any) and compensate
for the same. The signal strength for the jth transmitter-
receiver antenna pair and the kth OFDM subcarrier for
packet n is given by
Hj,k(n) = Tx(n) +Gt +Gr − Lj,k(n) + Ψj,k(n), (5)
where Tx(n) is the transmit power of the transmitter for
packet n, Gt and Gr are the transmitter and receiver an-
tenna gains, respectively, Lj,k(n) is the path loss, and Ψj,k(i)
is a noise term.
The attacker does not know the transmit power or an-
tenna gains, so she relies on the difference between the signal
strength for the packet n and the reference packet (n = 0)
as follows.
hj,k(n) , Hj,k(n)−Hj,k(0). (6)
From (5), we see that
hj,k(n) = tx(n)− lj,k(n) + ψj,k(n), (7)
where tx(n) = Tx(n) − Tx(0), lj,k(n) = Lj,k(n) − Lj,k(0),
and ψj,k(n) = Ψj,k(n)−Ψj,k(0).
In absense of any transmit power changes, hj,k(n) is domi-
nated by path loss changes caused when a person crosses the
link and abrupt variation in hj,k(n) can be used to detect line
crossings. However, any transmit power change (introduced
artificially) at the transmitter dominates the hj,k(n) term
and masks the effect of channel variation caused by human
movement. A transmitter could thus presumably preserve
location privacy by changing its transmit power frequently
to introduce artifical signal strength variations.
We now propose a method that a smart attacker can use
to estimate and remove the artificial power changes and ac-
curately detect line crossings. In our method, the attacker
estimates the artificial transmit power change amplitude
by correlating measurements across all antenna pairs and
all subcarriers, and removes the effect of transmit power
changes from the received signal strength measurements.
We propose to use the median of hk,j(n) for all available
transmitter-receiver antenna pairs and corresponding sub-
carriers, as an estimator of the artificial transmit power
change, as shown in the equation below:
tˆx(n) = median {hj,k(n)∀j, k} . (8)
Our choice of this estimator is based on the following obser-
vations. First, we observe that tx(n) appears in the equation
for hk,j(n) for all j and k. This is because, any change in
transmit power affects measurements across all transmitter-
receiver antenna pairs and corresponding subcarriers simul-
taneously. We also know that the change in the path loss
lj,k is just as likely to be positive as negative. Furthermore,
any change due to human movement will not affect all the
links simultaneously.
In the absence of an artificial transmit power change, tˆx(n)
is likely to be close to zero, i.e., our estimator does not re-
quire us to detect whether or not there is an artificial trans-
mit power change for packet n.
The compensated signal strength for packet n, which we
denote Hˆj,k(n), is given by
Hˆj,k(n) = Hj,k(n)− tˆx(n). (9)
Although the reference packet was sent with unknown trans-
mit power Tx(0), for n > 0, we consider Tx(n) to be the rela-
tive dB shift in transmit power compared to Tx(0). Hˆj,k(n)
essentially, is an estimate of the subcarrier signal strength if
there were no transmit power changes between the reference
packet and packet n.
It is clear that, any error in the estimation of the transmit
power changes amplitude will introduce additional noise in
the measurements. However, the dynamics of the signal are





































Figure 2: (a) The MIMO antenna array used for line crossing detection.(b) Direction of motion is determined by slope of the
line fitted to the points created by the spatial indexes of the antennas and the packet indexes.
signal over a short time period in order to notice motion of
a person near the link line.
3.4 ZigBee Networks
The methodologies described above are also applicable for
IEEE 802.15.4 ZigBee nodes. However, the ZigBee nodes
are generally equipped with a single antenna, so the MIMO
setup is not available. Moreover, ZigBee nodes do not use
OFDM for communication, so we use channel information
from a single frequency channel (instead of averaging across
all subcarriers as in the case of OFDM) to evaluate our
methodologies. Furthermore, there is no tool to get the com-
plete CSI at the receiver. Instead, we rely on the RSS value
obtained from the receiver hardware. Thus, in the case of
ZigBee we set Hj,k(n) to the RSS value measured in deci-
bel units for the jth transmitter-receiver antenna pair for
packet n, also k = 1,∀j as we have measurements from a
single channel only.
In order to create spatial diversity we use three closely lo-
cated ZigBee receivers together to form a group as described
in Section 4. We detect line crossings by applying our ma-
jority vote approach on the three links formed between the
transmitter and the three receivers in the group. We detect
direction of motion using two groups of receivers and observ-
ing sequence of groups crossed over a short time window.
We estimate and compensate for artificial transmit power
changes (if any) by applying the methods described in Sec-
tion 3.3, and utilizing the fact that any change in transmit
power affects all receivers simultaneously across all groups.
4. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we describe the experimental setup. Sec-
tion 4.1 describes the tools we use to measure the wireless
channel, Section 4.2 describes the transmit power changes
we apply, and Section 4.3 describes two real-world experi-
mental deployments.
4.1 Tool Description
We use the following tools to measure the wireless channel
and detect line crossings.
WiFi: We use laptops with Intel 5300 NICs that have
three-antenna MIMO 802.11n radios. We use the CSI Tool
[9], that has been built for these radios, to get channel state
information from the WiFi transmitter. The CSI tool ex-
tracts 802.11n channel state information for 30 subcarrier
at each antenna pair. Since we use three antennas at each
node for communication, for each transmitter-receiver pair,
we have 3× 3 = 9 links each with 30 subcarrier groups. We
use two kinds of antenna separations - in the normal case
(WiFi NORM), we place the antennas 6 cm apart, in the
other case (WiFi SEP), we use a larger antenna separation
of 30 cm. The increased separation is accomplished by con-
necting the antennas to the Intel 5300 NIC with standard
RF cables that are long enough to provide up to 30 cm sep-
aration. We program the transmitter to transmit packets at
a rate of 10 Hz which is similar to beacon frame rates of a
standard wireless access point. The attack receivers use the
CSI Tool to obtain channel state information from the re-
ceived packets which in turn is used to detect line crossings
as described in Section 3.1.
ZigBee: For the ZigBee experiments, we use Texas Instru-
ment CC2531 USB dongles [22], which are equipped with
low-power, IEEE 802.15.4-compliant radios operating in the
2.4 GHz ISM band. The transmission frequency in this case
is 12 Hz. A laptop is used to process the measured data
at the attack receivers. There is no tool to obtain the CSI
information in the case of ZigBee nodes. Therefore, we use
the RSS value (in dBm) measured by the receiver hardware
for our analysis, as described in Section 3.4.
4.2 Transmit Power Variations
We consider three different settings of transmit power
variations for our experiments:
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(a) University hallway. (b) Residential.
Figure 3: Network layouts. We show maps of the University Hallway and the Residential House and mark the location of the
legitimate transmitter(s) and the attack receivers. We also highlight the route(s) followed by the walking person.
TX NORMAL: In this case, the transmitters transmit with
fixed transmit power and variations in RSS are due to per-
son movement and noise only.
TX LINECROSS: For finer control, we simulate the effect
of transmit power change (for both WiFi and ZigBee) by
modifying received data according to a power profile that
replicates typical signal attenuation introduced by a person
crossing the link line. We randomly select different time
points in the measurements to introduce effect of transmit
power change.
TX RANDOM: Here, we experimentally implement or sim-
ulate the scenario where the transmitter may use a different
power level for each transmission by randomly selecting from
a predefined set of power levels supported by the hardware.
For ZigBee nodes, we program the transmitter(s) to change
its transmit power at each transmission by randomly select-
ing one among four pre-defined transmit power levels, i.e.,
+4.5 dBm, −1.5 dBm, −6 dBm, and−10 dBm. However, we
are unable to program the random power changes in WiFi
nodes and hence, we simulate these power changes.
While simulating effects of transmit power change we rely
on the fact that any change in the transmit power at a time
instant is observed across all subcarriers for all transmitter-
receiver antenna pairs in case of WiFi and across all receivers
in case of ZigBee at the same instant and we change the
received signal parameters accordingly. We also add a zero
mean Gaussian random variable (with standard deviation
0.67) to each Hj,k(n) measurement, in addition to the the
transmit power change tx(n), to account for errors due to
environmental noise.
4.3 Experimental Deployments
We evaluate our methodologies in two different real world
settings.
4.3.1 University Hallway
We choose a hallway inside a university building as the
area being monitored (Figure 3(a)). The hallway is adja-
cent to a 30 cm thick and 3.5 m tall rebar-reinforced con-
crete boundary wall. We note that this type of a wall causes
significant RF attenuation at WiFi frequencies and repre-
sents a worst-case scenario among typical exterior walls for
our purposes [20]. We place the attack receivers outside the
boundary wall parallel to the hallway approximately 1 m
away from the wall, at a height of 1.2m.
For theWiFi experiment, we deploy one transmitter inside
the building across the hallway, and two attack receivers
separated by 3 m outside the concrete wall (Figure 3(a)).
Similarly, for the ZigBee network, we deploy one transmitter
across the hallway and six receivers outside the boundary
wall. The attack receivers are placed in two groups of three
nodes each, with the distance between the groups being 3
m (Figure 3(a)). Nodes in the same group are almost 30
cm apart. We perform both TX NORMAL and TX RAND
experiments with the same ZigBee setup.
During the experiment, a person is walking back and forth
along a predefined path (shown as route in Figure 3(a))
along the corridor between the transmitter and the attack
receivers. With the help of a metronome, the person walks
at a constant speed of 0.5 m/s. We collect over 12, 000 data
samples for WiFi and over 20, 000 data samples for ZigBee
in this experiment. In our evaluation, we use ws = 4 s (short
time window), and wl = 40 s (long term window) (Section
3.1). Note that, ws must be chosen such that it effectively
captures the effect of short term variation in signal strength
due to human movement in the vicinity of the link. We ob-
serve that, for typical movements these variations last for
about 2-6 seconds (Figure 5). We use the mean value for
our evaluation (our results do not change significantly if we
other values in the 2-6 seconds range). On the other hand,
wl must be large enough to capture the long term behavior
of the link, and should not get affected by short term move-
ments. We select a moderately large value for wl that effec-
tively captures the long term link behavior, and keeps the
computation complexity under reasonable bounds so that
the detection can be performed in real time.
4.3.2 Residential House
In this experiment, we monitor two sides of a residential
house (Figure 3(b)) to detect people movement. We perform
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two sets of experiment with the WiFi nodes. In the first
experiment (House 1), we place the WiFi transmitter in a
corridor centrally located inside the house and two WiFi
receivers with normal antenna separation (WiFi NORM) in
the backyard of the house outside the external wall as shown
in the Figure 3(b). The receivers are placed approximately
1 m away from each other, both at a height of 1.2m. For
the second experiment (House 2), we use two WiFi receivers
with larger antenna separation (WiFi SEP) and place one
of them in the backyard and the other outside the front
entrance. The transmitter is placed in the same position as
in experiment House 1.
For the ZigBee network, we place two groups of receivers,
each group with three nodes, on either side of the house out-
side the external walls. As shown in Figure 3(b), the ZigBee
groups 1 & 2 are placed outside the front entrance, and
groups 3 and 4 are placed in the backyard, approximately 1
m away from the walls. Nodes in the same group are almost
30 cm apart while the inter-group distance on either side
being at least 1 m. The ZigBee transmitter is placed inside
the house co-located with the WiFi transmitter.
During these residential experiments, a person walks in-
side the house back and forth first near the front entrance
of the house (route 1 in the Figure 3(b)), and then in the
living room which is near the rear end of the house (shown
as route 2 in the Figure 3(b)). Finally, the person makes
a few rounds inside the house as shown in route 3 in the
Figure 3(b). We collect over 10, 000 data samples for each
set of ZigBee and WiFi experiments. We video record the
line crossings to test the accuracy of our detection method
against ground truth. For the residential experiments, we
use ws = 2 s (short time window), wl = 20 s (long term
window) and ∆ = 4 s (Section 3.1). We use smaller window
sizes for detection of line crossings as the person walks at a
faster speed as compared to the University Hallway experi-
ments.
In our experiments, we place the transmitter on a stand
that is approximately 1.2 m high. We understand that trans-
mitters are sometimes placed on a ceiling. However, given
that transmitters are typically placed well inside boundary
walls for coverage reasons, we can assume that movement
behind boundary walls will still result in line of sight cross-
ings between the transmitter and receivers that an attacker
deploys at low heights. Furthermore, even if transmitter and
receiver are both at ceiling height, there should be changes
in CSI observed, as shown by [29]. An attacker may also use
existing works on source localization [16, 17] to determine
the location of the wireless transmitter, and plan the target
area of detection accordingly.
We end this section by noting that while our experiments
consider only one wireless transmitter, it is very likely that
multiple transmitters will be present in a common home/uni-
versity setting. However, WiFi transmitters actively avoid
interfering with each other due to the 802.11 MAC protocol.
Wireless devices, such as WiFi access points, also attempt
to operate on different channels for minimizing transmission
overlap. Therefore, signals from wireless transmitters can
still be received at the attack receivers. Additionally, we can
identify the transmitter a packet is coming from using RSS-
based or other signatures. We will thoroughly investigate
the impact of multiple transmitters on detection accuracy
in our future work.
5. RESULTS
We evaluate the performance of the MRW attack in terms
of false alarm and missed detection rates. False alarm (FA)
rates are calculated as the number of line crossings wrongly
detected by the system over the number of sample points.
Missed detection (MD) rates are calculated as the number
of actual line crossings not detected by the system over the
total number of actual line crossings.
5.1 Detection of Line Crossing
In this section, we present the accuracy of detection of
line crossings using the methodology as described in Section
3.1.
5.1.1 University Hallway
Table 1 lists the results obtained in the University Hallway
experiment using our majority vote detection. We achieve
almost 100% detection rate with few false alarms and missed
detections. Using a WiFi 802.11n receiver with normal an-
tenna separation, we get zero false alarms and only 1.92%
missed detections. We compare the detected crossing times
with those in the recorded video footage of the experiment
and find that we can detect the crossing times with an av-
erage error of 0.79 s, with minimum and maximum errors of
0.03 s and 2.73 s respectively.
We obtain zero false alarms and missed detections when
using a 802.11n WiFi receiver with a large spatial separation
between antennas, the mean error in this case being 1.22 s.
For ZigBee, using a group of three closely located receivers,
we get a 2.66% false alarm rate and a 1.67% missed detection
rate in line crossing detection with an average error of 1.22
seconds. We use two groups of receivers and experiment with
three different transmitter locations in case of ZigBee. We
obtain the above results by averaging over all transmitter
location and receiver group pairs.
Note that, while computing the errors as compared to the
ground truth, we consider the line connecting the centroid
of transmitter antenna locations (or the transmitter location
in case of ZigBee) and the centroid of the receiver antenna
locations (or the centroid of the receiver locations in the
group in case of ZigBee) as the representative link line.
5.1.2 Residential House
We present the detection accuracy of the Residential House
experiment in Table 2. We achieve greater than 94% de-
tection accuracy with a 0.043% false alarm rate while using
WiFi receivers with normal antenna separation (WiFi NOR-
M). With larger antenna separation (WiFi SEP) the accu-
racy is greater than 95% with a 0.005% false alarm rate.
The mean error in detection of line crossings is 1.06s in case
of WiFi NORM, the same being 0.56s for WiFi SEP.
For ZigBee, we achieve greater than 99% accuracy in de-
tection with a false alarm rate of 0.004% only. The average
error in time-of-crossing estimation in this case is 1.63 s.
Note that during this experiment, we placed one group of
ZigBee nodes (group 2) directly in front of the metal-plated
entrance door. The packet reception rates for receivers in
this group are much lower than the receivers in the other
groups. Also, perhaps due to attenuation through the door,
the RSS measurements made by this group are more noisy
than those made by the other groups, leading to further
degradation in performance. The missed detection rate for
this group is almost 30%, about 60 times more than the
75
Table 1: Detection Accuracy (Hallway).
Hallway Accuracy Error (sec)
Experiment: FA% MD% Min Max Mean
WiFi NORM 0 1.92 0.03 2.73 0.79
WiFi SEP 0 0 0.27 2.37 1.22
ZigBee 0 1.02 0.27 2.37 1.22
Table 2: Detection Accuracy (House).
House Accuracy Error (sec)
Experiment: FA% MD% Min Max Mean
WiFi NORM 0.043 5.70 0.29 2.78 1.06
WiFi SEP 0.005 4.35 0.03 1.82 0.56
ZigBee 0.004 0.49 0.10 3.55 1.63
average missed detection rate of other groups (results pre-
sented in Table 2 are averaged over the other three groups).
Thus, we conclude that, although an MRW attack can pen-
etrate concrete and brick walls, metallic structures in the
line of sight path of the radio signals degrades the detection
accuracy significantly.
5.2 Determining Direction of Motion
In this section, we present the accuracy we achieve in de-
tecting the direction of motion for each experiment.
5.2.1 University Hallway
In the university hallway experiment, the corridor was
crossed by a moving person an equal number of times in
either direction. We achieve 100% accuracy in detecting
direction of movement on either side of the corridor while
using twoWiFi receivers or two groups of ZigBee nodes using
the method described in Section 3.2.
We also achieve an accuracy as high as 90.38% in detecting
direction of motion with only a single WiFi 802.11n receiver
by increasing the spatial separation of the MIMO antennas.
The accuracy with a single WiFi receiver with standard an-
tenna separation is 59.62%, which is slightly better than
guessing the direction of motion.
5.2.2 Residential House
For the experiment performed in the residential house we
again achieve 100% accuracy in detection while using two
WiFi receivers with standard antenna separation (experi-
ment House 1) or two groups of ZigBee nodes on either side
of the house. Individual detection accuracy of the two WiFi
receivers (with standard antenna separation placed on the
same side of the house as in experiment House 1) used are
100% (RX1) and 68% (RX2) respectively. Detection accu-
racy with spatially separated antennas for these receivers
(when they are placed on opposite sides of the house as
in experiment House 2) are 96% (RX1) and 52.6% (RX2)
respectively. These results differ from the University Hall-
way experiment where we get better accuracy in detecting
direction of movement while using large spatial separation
between antennas as compared to using normal antenna sep-
aration. The degradation in accuracy with antenna separa-
tion in Residential House experiment may be due to the fact
that during the House 2 experiment, walking speed of the
person was about 20% faster as compared to the House 1





























Figure 4: The majority vote over transmitter-receiver an-
tenna pairs reduces false alarms and missed detections.
(a),(b), and (c) show the results of the windowed variance
based line crossing detection for three antenna pairs using
Wifi. In (d), we see that the majority vote eliminates false
alarms and missed detections.
times for individual antennas overlapped with each other in
some cases.
To summarize, a MRW adversary should use two WiFi
receivers or two groups of ZigBee nodes to detect direction
of motion accurately. It is possible to achieve high accuracy
even with a single WiFi receiver in some cases (e.g. RX1
in experiments House 1 and House 2), however the results
depend on the environment and need further investigation.
5.3 Advantages of Majority Vote
In this section, we show how our majority vote approach
helps overcome inherent uncertainties in wireless links. All
wireless links are not equally sensitive to motion occurring
in their vicinity and the sensitivity varies with link fade level
along with other factors. Since it is not possible for an ad-
versary to know beforehand whether a link is good or bad
for detecting LOS crossings, he relies on correlation among
multiple closely located links and infers a line crossing only
when majority of these closely located links indicates a cross-
ing. In our experiments, 3× 3 = 9 links between the MIMO
transmitter-receiver antenna pairs are considered for major-
ity vote in the WiFi case, and groups of 3 single-antenna
receivers in the ZigBee case. Figure 4 shows one scenario
where our majority vote algorithm helps get rid of some false
alarms and missed detections due to one bad WiFi link (for
clarity we show three out of the nine links) from the Univer-
sity Hallway experiment. As can be seen the link in Figure
4(b), fails to detect a line crossing that occurs around 100
s, however the other two links (Figure 4(a) & Figure 4(c))
detect the crossing and a majority vote among these three
links detects the crossing at that time (Figure 4(d)). Simi-
larly, we see that the link in Figure 4(b) flags a false alarm at
180 s but the other two links do not indicate any crossing.
Hence again the majority vote gets rid of the false alarm
at time 180 s (Figure 4(d)), thereby improving the overall
accuracy of the system.
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(a) TX RANDOM (WiFi)



































(b) TX LINECROSS (ZigBee)
Figure 5: Measured CSI and RSS (top) without and (middle) with TX power change; and (bottom) after compensation.












































































Figure 6: Compensation accuracy in the University Hallway Experiment.










































































Figure 7: Compensation accuracy in the Residential House Experiment.
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To summarize - a single wireless link suffices in some cases
in detection of line crossings between a transmitter and a re-
ceiver, however the results are not always reliable due to in-
herent uncertainties in link sensitivity to object movements.
We can improve accuracy and reliability by correlating de-
tections across multiple co-located links using a majority
vote approach.
5.4 Compensation for Transmit Power Change
In this section, we show how transmit power changes (ran-
dom or strategic) affect line crossing detection accuracy and
how our compensation method nullifies the effect of such
power changes. Figure 5(a) shows the effect of random trans-
mit power changes on line crossing detection for a WiFi link
between a single transmitter-receiver antenna pair that is
crossed three times by a moving person. The top figure cor-
responds to the case when there is no transmit power change.
This figure clearly shows distinct short time periods of high
variance in the CSI corresponding to the times when the per-
son crosses the link. However, transmit power change masks
these distinct short term variance regions and renders line
crossing detection ineffective as can be seen in the figure in
the middle. The bottom figure plots the CSI for the same
link after compensating for the transmit power changes as
described in Section 3.3. Clearly, our compensation method
almost nullifies the masking effect of transmit power changes
and the attacker can detect three line crossings (high short
term variance region) from the compensated signal. Simi-
larly, Figure 5(b) shows how strategic power changes can be
used to simulate link line crossings, and how our compensa-
tion method eliminates these artificial variations. The top
figure plots the RSS in dBm for a ZigBee link that is crossed
during the time interval 856-860 s. The figure in the mid-
dle shows one additional line crossing (high variance region)
introduced in the link by strategic transmit power changes
during time interval 838-841 s. However, as seen from the
bottom figure, our compensation method gets rid of the false
alarm introduced by strategic power change and we can de-
tect the original line crossing from the compensated signal.
In the Figure 6 we show false alarms and missed detec-
tions induced by transmit power changes and the accuracy of
our compensation method in the University Hallway experi-
ment. In the figure, NORMAL corresponds to the case when
the transmitter transmits with fixed transmit power, CRS
is when strategic power changes are introduced in the data
using TX LINECROSS simulation, CRS CMP corresponds
to the results when we apply our compensation method on
TX CRS. Similarly, RND shows results when the transmit-
ter is changing its transmit power randomly with each trans-
mission, while RND CMP is the corresponding compensa-
tion results.
As an example, in the University Hallway experiment, a
strategic transmit power change at the WiFi transmitter in-
creases the missed detections rate from 1.92% to 32.69% and
the false alarms rate from 0% to 0.199% when using a WiFi
receiver with normal antenna separation. However, our com-
pensation method gets rid of all the additional false alarms
and missed detections. Similarly, random power changes for
the ZigBee experiment increases the false alarms rate from
0% to 0.254%, but our compensation method brings it back
to only 0.010%. We obtain similar results in the Residen-
tial House experiment (Figure 7). For example, for random
power changes at the ZigBee transmitter, the missed de-
tections rate increases to 31.37% from 0.94% and the false
alarms rate increases to 0.429% from 0.003% but our com-
pensation method brings down the missed detection and
false alarm rates to only 0.94% and 0.006%, respectively.
To summarize our findings, transmit power changes (strate-
gic or random) increase the false alarm and missed detec-
tion rates significantly. However, using our compensation
method, an attacker can accurately estimate the transmit
power change amplitude and compensate for the same to
get rid of the adverse effect caused by such changes and,
still sense people location and motion with high accuracy.
5.5 Detection with Varying TransmissionRate
ZigBee applications in modern facilities use different trans-
mission rates for communication. To understand the effect of
lower transmission rates on detection accuracy, we use the
data from TX NORMAL for both the University Hallway
and Residential House experiment to simulate lower trans-
mission rates. Note that the original transmission rate is
approximately 12 Hz. We simulate three additional trans-
mission rates - 6 Hz, 4 Hz and 2 Hz respectively from the
original data. Figure 8 shows the results of our simulation.
We find that the overall detection rates decrease with lower
transmission rates. For the transmission rate of 6 transmis-
sions/second, accuracy of the detector is over 98% for the
University Hallway experiment and over 96% for the Resi-
dential House experiment. These results are similar to what
we observe for original transmission frequency of 12 Hz. The
accuracy is worst for transmission frequency of 2 Hz with the
detection rate being as low as 71% for the Residential House
experiment. For the transmission rate of 4Hz, the detection
rate degrades to 87% in the University Hallway experiment,
although it remains greater than 96% for the Residential
House experiment. We do not see any noticeable change in
the false alarm rates with varying transmission rate.
6. ADDITIONAL RELATED WORK
In recent years, device-free localization (DFL), in which
people who are not carrying any radio transmitters are lo-
cated by a static deployed network, has been the subject of
intense research. Our MRW attack is significantly different
from traditional DFL work in that the MRW attack is prac-
tical for large buildings, is stealthy because no transmitters
are deployed by the attacker, and is immune from jamming.
DFL systems such as the ones in [4, 11–13, 15, 24, 24, 25, 30]
require dozens of radio transceivers deployed throughout or
on many sides of the target area. Further, through-building
DFL systems such as [25,31] assume the transmitted signal
penetrates through two external walls and any internal walls
in between, and as such have been tested only in buildings of
small (18 - 42 m2) size. In this paper, we show access to one
side is sufficient for an MRW attack, and it requires a signal
from inside a building to penetrate only one external wall.
Other fingerprint-based DFL systems [14, 19, 23, 27] require
collection of training data with a person in each possible
location in the environment. In our MRW attack, we do
not assume that an attacker has prior access to the inside
of the building to be able to perform such data collection.
Further, to perform DFL, an attacker must deploy some
nodes which transmit, exposing them to being detected and
located by RF source localization, while an MRW attack is
stealthier in that purely passive receivers are deployed by an

































































Figure 8: Detection accuracy with varying transmission rates (ZigBee).
with by a powerful jammer. In the method in this paper,
any transmitter in the building, including a jammer, could
be used as a source for MRW. The work in [5] presents a
through-walls passive WiFi radar system. In it, a receiver is
situated outside the target building and a Wi-Fi AP placed
inside the building and having a narrow-beamwidth direc-
tional antenna is used as transmitter. The signal received
by the passive radar detector is then used to create a range-
Doppler surface and detect a moving target. Our work is
complementary to [5], first, because we use different mea-
surements. Doppler information in [5] is used to estimate
relative velocity; in our work, received power or CSI is used
to infer presence (even when stationary) on the link line. In
theory, both could be used to improve localization accuracy.
For example, while a person is crossing perpendicular to the
link line, the cause no Doppler shift, but our system would
detect their direction of motion. Second, we note that the
receiver in [5] is a specialized radar receiver with a PC for
intensive oﬄine processing. In comparison, our system uses
standard transceivers and requires little processing, and thus
is suitable for real time monitoring by an adversary with
only standard hardware. We demonstrate that, random or
pre-defined transmit power change, used as a possible coun-
termeasure, can not protect the privacy of the location of
people inside the target area. To the best of our knowledge,
no previous work on location privacy can function accurately
in presence of purposeful transmit power changes.
Several existing works focusing on location privacy typi-
cally assume that the victims of the attack are carrying an
actively communicating wireless device [3, 6–8, 10]. We fo-
cus on obtaining location information where the person be-
ing monitored does not actively participate in the detection
process.
7. CONCLUSION
We investigated the ability of an attacker to surrepti-
tiously use an otherwise secure wireless network to detect a
moving person through walls. We designed and implemented
an attack methodology, to passively obtain through wall per-
son movement information, that reliably detects when a per-
son crosses the link lines between the legitimate transmitters
and the attack receivers by using physical layer measure-
ments. We also developed a method to determine the direc-
tion of movement of a person from the sequence of link lines
crossed during a short time interval. Additionally, we de-
scribed how an attacker may estimate any artificial changes
in transmit power (used as a countermeasure), compensate
for these power changes using measurements from sufficient
number of links, and still detect line crossings. We imple-
mented our methodology on WiFi and ZigBee nodes and
experimentally evaluated the MRW attack by monitoring
people movements through walls in two real-world settings.
We found that our methods achieve close to 100% accuracy
in detecting line crossings and the direction of movement.
The limitation of our proposed methodology is that it works
for detecting movement of only a single person at a time.
Future work must develop methodology for passively locat-
ing multiple people through walls in more dynamic environ-
ments.
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